FOREWORD
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While the greatest threats of the nuclear arms race have perhaps
now been tempered, the United States and the world continue to face
arms control issues of tremendous significance. In some ways, the
collapse of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the problems we encountered during the Cold War. The need for hard currency caused
by the weakened economies of the Newly Independent States, the
lack of effective national controls over nuclear weapons systems and
storage facilities, and the sagging morale of the military who are
charged with controlling and safeguarding weapons of mass destruction and facilities, seemingly invite black market proliferation of
these weapons and fissile materials. Further, the international community continues to be frustrated in its attempts to either regulate or
totally ban the production, storage and use of chemical and biological
weapons by states that consider them a viable counterforce to the
major nuclear powers.
Iraq's ongoing resistance to allow U.N. personnel to inspect all
its potential chemical and biological weapons production and storage
facilities is but one example of this problem. Moreover, if weapons
of mass destruction are being produced and stockpiled without completely effective international control and enforcement regimes, a
terrorist group or rogue state remains unchecked in its capability to
procure these weapon systems and use them indiscriminately. Some
weapons of mass destruction can even be produced from readily
available materials in unsophisticated laboratories anywhere in the
world, as illustrated by the 20 March 1995 sain gas attack by members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect upon the Japanese subway system,
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which killed eleven people and injured almost a thousand more.'
U.S. policy on controlling weapons of mass destruction is especially complicated by the absence of a clear national consensus about
how to proceed. This was evidenced in part by the statement issued
two years ago by over fifty flag officers from the United States and
around the world renouncing nuclear weapons on moral grounds and
urging unilateral disarmament-a position quickly challenged by
other respected authorities on U.S. policy?
Scant guidance on the applicable law was gained from the 8 July
1996 advisory decision of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.4 The convoluted
opinion was rife with ambiguity and the Court's most celebrated
holding-that the threat or the use of nuclear arms is generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts
except in an extreme circumstance in which a state's very survival
would be at stake-almost defies an agreed-upon interpretation or
application. Then again, even in cases where potential nuclear,
chemical or biological threats have been addressed by international
treaties, questions remain in the United States about verification and
enforcement of those agreements. The heated debate in the U.S.
Senate last April on the advisability of approving ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, a seemingly straightforward treaty
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banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, reflects the great division in the United States over the
propriety of ratifying treaties that have no deterrent effect upon
those non-treaty states most prone to the use of chemical or biological warfare or to supporting terrorist activities. In the end, the treaty
was approved for ratification only after provision was made for
twenty-eight "understandings," which ostensibly gave clarification to
how the United States interprets significant portions of the signed
agreement! It was perhaps not mere happenstance that an accord
was reached at the same time between the Clinton administration
and North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, for restructuring the State Department-a goal long sought by Helms.'
It was against this backdrop of world events that Duke Law
School's Center on Law, Ethics and National Security hosted a conference in Durham in April 1997 entitled "Contemporary Issues in
Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction," with the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia serving as a cosponsor for the event. The intent was to bring together a group of
distinguished scholars, U.S. administration officials and others to
provide a focus to the perplexing problem of controlling weapons of
mass destruction by identifying key issues and proposing recommended action. Several of the articles in this symposium edition of
the Journalare the result of papers presented at that conference.
The lead essay by Dr. Graham Allison from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University introduces the extreme vulnerability of the United States to acts of chemical, nuclear
or biological megaterrorism, especially in light of what Allison terms
the threat of "loose nukes"-uncontrolled nuclear weapons and
weapons-grade material in Russia that could be stolen or sold to terrorists or rogue states for use against this country. Dr. Allison
chronicles the deteriorating political and economic conditions in Russia following the demise of the Soviet Union, conditions resulting in
uncontrolled nuclear weaponry, and he then discusses some deterrents that have, so far, limited the number of acts of megaterrorism in
the world. He concludes with a call to action by proposing national
security decisions and programs he believes essential to deal with the
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vast amount of nuclear weapons-grade materials still in Russia and
the threat those materials pose if left uncontrolled. He argues that
the United States must recognize the reality and seriousness of the
threat, and institute immediate and high-priority actions in order to
avert a major tragedy on American soil.
The continued viability of nuclear weapons as an effective deterrent in U.S. national security policy is considered in two complementary essays, one authored by retired Air Force General Charles Horner, who headed the coalition's air campaign in the Persian Gulf War,
and the other by Stephen Hadley, who served as Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy in the Bush administration. General Homer, who was one of the signers of the 1996 statement renouncing the use of nuclear weapons on moral grounds, 9 argues that the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is no longer
credible against either the rational or the irrational actor. As to the
former, he argues that our historical success with conventional weapons, as for example against Iraq, leads many states to conclude that it
would be untenable for an American president to use nuclear weapons; and as to the latter, he suggests that an irrational actor would be
unconcerned with the consequences of a nuclear strike against it and
would perhaps even invite such an attack. Homer suggests that new
policies must be developed to protect our vital national security interests and he proposes a three-phased approach to deal with the
threats that confront our country today. Stephen Hadley, on the
other hand, argues that the debate over the use of nuclear weapons
has failed to acknowledge the major changes that have been made in
U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture since the end of the Cold
War, and that it is simply wrong to characterize U.S. policy as either
irresponsible or immoral. He credits the security arrangements developed after World War II, arrangements in which the threatened
use of nuclear weapons was an integral part, for securing and maintaining peace in Europe for the last forty-five years.
Hadley asserts that the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is
unachievable-as nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented-and that a
nuclear weapons capability may also serve as a credible deterrent
against the modem-day threat of the use of chemical or biological
weapons. But even in defending a continued nuclear deterrent capability, Hadley suggests a series of actions that must be taken to en9. See Statement on Nuclear Weapons by InternationalGenerals andAdmirals, supra note
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hance the peace and security of the United States and its allies.
Captain Mark Rosen, an active-duty attorney in the U.S. Navy,
critically analyzes efforts within the international community to create regional nuclear weapons free zones. He explores the question of
whether the United States should lend support to the creation of such
zones or whether these regional initiatives detract from the ongoing
international arms control regimes in which the United States is already engaged. He argues that U.S. support for the regional zones is
potentially destabilizing and suggests that such support detracts from
the global anti-proliferation effort. In view of the number of nuclear
free zones either in existence or being proposed, Captain Rosen
urges a calm and reflective look at their efficacy.
The effective control of weapons of mass destruction, and the resultant enhancement of efforts to achieve a true world peace, will
continue to be major goals challenging the global community for the
foreseeable future. To that.end, the Duke Journalof Comparative&
InternationalLaw offers this symposium edition in the hopes of contributing to the ongoing international dialogue crucial to the
achievement of those goals.

